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 Non-Traditional Activism 
USING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS TO URGE LGBT NON-
DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Apache Corporation (“Apache”) is an energy company that does 
business across the world.1 Until recently, Apache’s non-discrimination 
policy allowed discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity.2 In October 2007, several Apache shareholders, all New 
York City pension funds (“The Funds”),3 sought to correct this blatant 
disregard for civil rights by submitting a proposal for Apache’s 2008 
annual shareholder meeting.4 The proposal asked the company to 
“implement equal employment opportunity policies based on [ten] 
principles prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity.”5 The principles listed in the proposal are those that 
several other Fortune 500 corporations have used when implementing 
their non-discrimination policies.6 The Funds argued that if these non-
  
 1 Apache Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 29, 2008). 
 2 Apache Corp. v. New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys., No. H-08-1064, 2008 WL 
1821728, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2008). 
 3 Id. at *1. The five funds were the New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 
New York City Teachers’ Retirement System, New York City Police Pension Fund, New York City 
Fire Department Pension Fund, and New York City Board of Education Retirement System. Id. 
 4 Id. The proposal was submitted through the funds’ custodian and trustee. Id. The 
Office of the Comptroller of the City of New York was the trustee and custodian for all of the funds 
except that the Comptroller is only the custodian of the New York City Board of Education 
Retirement System. Id. at *1 n.1. 
 5 Id. at *2. 
 6 Id. The proposal stated: 
1) Discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity will be prohibited in 
the company’s employment policy statement. 2) The company’s non-discrimination 
policy will be distributed to all employees. 3) There shall be no discrimination based on 
any employee’s actual or perceived health condition, status, or disability. 4) There shall 
be no discrimination in the allocation of employee benefits on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity. 5) Sexual orientation and gender identity issues will be 
included in corporate employee diversity and sensitivity programs. 6) There shall be no 
discrimination in the recognition of employee groups based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity. 7) Corporate advertising policy will avoid the use of negative stereotypes 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 8) There shall be no discrimination in 
corporate advertising and marketing policy based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 
9) There shall be no discrimination in the sale of goods and services based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity, and 10) There shall be no policy barring on corporate 
charitable contributions to groups and organizations based on sexual orientation. 
Id.  
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discrimination policies were implemented, Apache shareholders would 
benefit from the company’s improved recruitment and retention of 
employees, increased employee morale and productivity, lowered 
litigation costs, and strengthened corporate reputation.7 
But Apache did not want its shareholders to vote on the proposal 
and sought to exclude the proposal from its proxy materials.8 On January 
3, 2008, Apache asked the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
“Commission”) to issue a no-action letter9 on the grounds that the 
proposal related to the company’s ordinary business operations and 
therefore could be excluded from Apache’s proxy materials under Rule 
14a-8(i)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.10 The Commission 
granted Apache’s request, stating that the Commission would not pursue 
enforcement actions against Apache if it excluded the proposal because 
there was “some basis” for Apache’s view that the proposal could be 
excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).11 Shortly thereafter, Apache mailed its 
proxy materials to its shareholders without the proposal.12 On April 8, 
2008, Apache sought a declaratory judgment13 in the Southern District of 
Texas that it properly excluded the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).14 In 
Apache Corp. v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, the court 
held that Apache properly excluded the shareholder proposal from its 
proxy statement because four of the proposal’s principles, those relating 
to advertising, marketing, sale of goods and services, and charitable 
contributions, did not, in their view, “implicate the social policy 
underlying the Proposal . . . [and sought to] micromanage the company 
to an unacceptable degree.”15  
The Apache case is a recent illustration of shareholders’ concern 
about lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”)16 rights and is an 
example of the types of non-discrimination proposals that are submitted 
by shareholders attempting to induce corporations to change their 
policies to include such protections.  
  
 7 Id.  
 8 See Apache Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 615894, at *1 (Mar. 5, 2008) 
[hereinafter Apache No-Action Letter]. For an explanation of how a company can be excused from 
sending a shareholder proposal to its other shareholders, see infra Part II.A. 
 9 For an explanation of no-action letters, see infra Part II.A. 
 10 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(7); Apache, 2008 WL 1821728, at *2. 
 11 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(7); Apache Letter, supra note 8, at *1. 
 12 Apache, 2008 WL 1821728, at *3. 
 13 It is unclear why Apache filed for declaratory judgment. It may be because the funds 
filed suit in the Southern District of New York claiming that Apache’s exclusion was improper. 
Apache may have thought that the Fifth Circuit may have been a more receptive forum for their 
argument. The New York suit was stayed pending the declaratory action in Texas. Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at *6-*8. 
 16 “LGBT” is an acronym commonly used to refer to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender individuals. The term “LGBT non-discrimination” will be used throughout this Note to 
refer to policies or laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity and expression. 
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It is also an example of an innovative and non-traditional 
weapon in civil rights activists’ arsenal because The Funds seem to have 
won the war. Shortly after the court’s decision in Apache’s favor, the 
company changed its non-discrimination policy to protect against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.17 
And the same thing has happened at other companies.18 In 2008, almost 
forty similar shareholder proposals were filed against companies like 
Apache, but shareholders only voted on fourteen.19 This is because 
companies are “eager to avoid a proxy fight on this issue[,]” choosing 
instead to negotiate with shareholders in implementing LGBT non-
discrimination policies.20  
And even when shareholders do vote, LGBT non-discrimination 
proposals historically receive high votes.21 The two highest shareholder 
votes on all 2008 proposals were LGBT non-discrimination proposals, 
each receiving over 52% of the shareholder vote.22 In all of these 
instances, shareholder activists have used a non-traditional mechanism to 
urge LGBT non-discrimination. 
But shareholders cannot count on a company’s acquiescence, 
and companies like Apache often fight the proposals.23 When that 
happens, activists’ endeavors are hampered by the Commission and some 
courts. This Note argues that the Commission and the Southern District 
of Texas responded incorrectly to the proposal and its litigation. Contrary 
to the Commission and court rulings, shareholder proposals seeking non-
discrimination protections based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity and expression should not fall under Rule 14a-8(i)(7)’s ordinary 
business exclusion and companies should be required to include them in 
their proxy materials when requested to do so by shareholders. 
Part II of this Note describes the shareholder proposal process 
and introduces shareholder proposals that seek non-discrimination 
policies based on sexual orientation and gender identity and expression. 
Part III then discusses the reasons why these proposals should not fall 
under Rule 14a-8(i)(7). It concludes that they raise significant social 
policy issues about which shareholders are able and entitled to make an 
informed judgment.  
  
 17 See APACHE CORPORATION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION POLICY (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.apachecorp.com/content/released/ 
Apache_EEO.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
 18 MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY SEASON PREVIEW 2009, at 6, 16 (2009), 
available at http://www.asyousow.org/csr/proxy-preview-2009.shtml (follow “Download” hyperlink). 
 19 Id. at 3. 
 20 Id. at 16. 
 21 See id. at 3. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See id. at 16. For example, in 2009, ExxonMobile is facing its tenth LGBT non-
discrimination proposal. Id. at 16. In 2008, the proposal drew a 40% shareholder vote. Id. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The extent to which shareholders can control or influence the 
management of the corporations in which they invest is a prominent 
issue in corporate law.24 Under statutory default rules, the board of 
directors controls the company, including hiring managers to run the 
day-to-day operations.25 Generally, shareholders have no rights to 
directly control or influence the corporation.26 
Despite default statutes, shareholders want—and do have—some 
ability to influence corporations. This influence is important because all 
shareholders are concerned about the company’s management since they 
have a stake in the company.27 Individual investors are often “rationally 
apathetic” about the management of a corporation—since they only own 
a small amount of shares, there are few incentives for them to fight for 
changes in management.28 On the other hand, institutional investors,29 
such as The Funds in the Apache case, often own a large amount of 
shares of a single corporation and therefore have a greater incentive to 
express their opinions and usually have the resources to make their 
opinions known to management.30 Shareholders are concerned about 
discrimination issues because of the high costs associated with the 
corporation being branded “discriminatory,” including lawsuit damages 
and reputational harm.31  
  
 24 See, e.g., Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1954) (shareholders wanted the 
president to be reinstated after he was dismissed by the board of directors). 
 25 See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2009). 
 26 Id. Default rules can be changed in an individual corporation by adding specific 
shareholder rights in the company’s certificate of incorporation. Id. 
 27 See Patricia Uhlenbrock, Note, Roll Out the Barrel: The SEC Reverses Its Stance on 
Employment-Related Shareholder Proposals under Rule 14a-8—Again, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 277, 279 
(2000). 
 28 Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
407, 417 (2006). 
Because each individual shareholder owns only a very small percentage of the 
outstanding shares of a corporation, she does not have a stake sufficient to make 
monitoring worthwhile. After all, becoming informed is costly; it is also futile, because 
one shareholder’s meager vote is unlikely to affect the outcome. Thus, shareholders tend 
to be rationally apathetic and support the incumbent board on the theory that the directors 
are experts and have access to greater information. 
Id. 
 29 Examples of institutional investors include pension funds, hedge funds, private equity 
funds, and foreign governments. Uhlenbrock, supra note 27, at 278 n.10. 
The stock market has had a long history of shareholder passivity, but this is likely a thing 
of the past. The rise of the institutional investor and the increased knowledge of 
stockholders as a whole is forcing an increased accountability to shareholders for many 
boards of directors. As a result, the demands of the Teamsters in its case against Fleming 
is something courts may encounter with increasing frequency in the years to come. 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 P.2d 907, 909 (Okla. 1999). 
 30 Velasco, supra note 28, at 425-26.  
 31 See Uhlenbrock, supra note 27, at 278. 
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A. Introduction to Shareholder Proposals 
One way in which shareholders can exercise influence over a 
corporation is through shareholder proposals. A shareholder proposal is a 
shareholder’s “recommendation or requirement that the company and/or 
its board of directors take action” that the shareholder intends to present 
at the company’s annual shareholder meeting.32 These proposals allow 
shareholders a platform for voicing their concerns or suggestions about 
the company to fellow shareholders.33 
Shareholders have the right to submit proposals independently, 
by sending their proposals to other shareholders themselves.34 Since the 
cost of sending their own proposals is often prohibitively high, 
shareholders rarely choose this option.35 
Instead, shareholders prefer to use Rule 14a-8 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 193436 to submit their proposals without incurring any 
mailing expenses.37 Rule 14a-8 requires a company to “include a 
shareholder’s proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in 
its form of proxy when the company holds an annual or special meeting 
of shareholders.”38 Proxy materials are sent out by management before a 
shareholder meeting. The materials include items that will be voted on at 
the meeting and also provide a mechanism for shareholders to vote by 
proxy, that is, to make sure that their vote is counted even if they are 
unable to attend the meeting. If a shareholder’s proposal must be 
included in management’s proxy materials, management can choose to 
state the reasons why it thinks that the other shareholders should vote 
against the proposal.39 In any case, if the proposal is included in 
management’s proxy, the cost of sending the proposal to the other 
shareholders is borne by the corporation.40 
To take advantage of the benefits of Rule 14a-8 submission, 
shareholders must comply with a host of procedural requirements.41 First, 
a proposal should state the shareholder’s recommendation or requirement 
  
 32 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (2006). Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
governs shareholder proposals and was re-organized into a “Plain-English Question & Answer 
Format” in 1998 to “make the rule easier for shareholders and companies to understand and follow.” 
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40,018, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 23,200, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,106-07 (May 28, 1998) [hereinafter 
1998 Adopted Changes Release]. 
 33 See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Exchange Act, Release Number 4950, 18 Fed. 
Reg. 6646, 6647 (Oct. 9, 1953) [hereinafter 1953 Proposed Changes Release].  
 34 See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 654 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 35 See Leslie Wayne, Shareholders Who Answer to a Higher C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
19, 2005, at C1. 
 36 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.  
 37 Obviously, shareholders must still incur the cost of writing the proposal.  
 38 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 
 39 Id. § 240.14a-8(m). 
 40 Uhlenbrock, supra note 27, at 281. 
 41 See, e.g., id. § 240.14a-8(c); id. § 240.14a-8(d); id. § 240.14a-8(e). 
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“as clearly as possible.”42 Second, the shareholder must prove that they 
have held a certain amount of the company’s securities for at least one 
year before the submission date and certify in writing that they intend to 
continue to hold them through the shareholder meeting.43 Third, 
shareholders may submit only one proposal per shareholder meeting.44 
Fourth, proposals and supporting materials must be less than 500 
words.45 Finally, the company must receive the proposal before the 
deadline provided in the statute.46  
Generally, any eligible shareholder’s proposal must be included 
in the corporation’s proxy materials if the shareholder meets all of the 
procedural requirements.47 But shareholder proposals may be omitted on 
substantive grounds.48 If a corporation wishes to exclude a proposal on 
substantive grounds, it must request a no-action letter from the 
Commission before the corporation files its proxy statement and form of 
proxy with the Commission.49 A no-action letter requests that the 
Commission’s staff review whether the corporation’s exclusion of the 
specific proposal would violate federal securities laws.50 While these 
letters are merely the informal views of the Commission’s staff, they are 
important because they are the interpretations of those who administer 
the federal securities laws and are often the only statements about the 
more obscure areas of these laws.51 
  
 42 Id. § 240.14a-8(a). 
 43 Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(1)-(2). The amount required is “at least $2,000 in market value, or 
1% of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting.” Id. A registered 
shareholder, one whose name is listed in the company’s records, is not required to demonstrate 
eligibility because ownership can be verified by the company. Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(2). A non-
registered shareholder can demonstrate eligibility by obtaining and submitting a written statement 
verifying continuous ownership from the record holder of the securities (i.e., from the broker or the 
bank in whose name the security is held in trust). Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(2)(i). 
 44 Id. § 240.14a-8(c). 
 45 Id. § 240.14a-8(d). 
 46 See id. § 240.14a-8(e)(1). 
 47 Id. § 240.14a-8. When this Note refers to excluding or omitting and including 
proposals, it means excluding or omitting the proposal from the company’s proxy statement. 
 48 Id. § 240.14a-8(i). 
 49 Id. § 240.14a-8(j)(1). The company must request the no-action letter at least 80 
calendar days before it files is proxy statement, but if a company can show “good cause,” the 
company may direct its no action letter request later than 80 days before filing its proxy statement 
and form of proxy. Id. 
 50 SEC, NO ACTION LETTERS, http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2009). 
An individual or entity who is not certain whether a particular product, service, or action 
would constitute a violation of the federal securities law may request a “no-action” letter 
from the SEC staff. Most no-action letters describe the request, analyze the particular 
facts and circumstances involved, discuss applicable laws and rules, and, if the staff 
grants the request for no action, concludes that the SEC staff would not recommend that 
the Commission take enforcement action against the requester based on the facts and 
representations described in the individual’s or entity’s original letter. 
Id. 
 51 See Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. LAW. 1019, 1019 (1987). 
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After a company requests a no-action letter, the Commission’s 
staff will respond either favorably, adversely, or will refuse to respond 
on the merits.52 In a favorable response, the staff will usually state that 
they “will not recommend any enforcement action to the Commission 
under a specific provision of law” if, in this case, a shareholder proposal 
is omitted from the company’s proxy materials.53 A no-response on the 
merits answer will occur if “the staff has indicated that legal, policy, or 
practical considerations may make it appropriate for it to respond on the 
merits of a no-action request.”54 Finally, an adverse response is one in 
which the staff cannot say that it will not recommend enforcement 
against to the Commission if the proposal is omitted.55 No-action letter 
requests involving omission of shareholder proposals are directed to the 
Division of Corporate Finance—the division that deals with the proxy 
aspects of the 1934 Act.56 
Most importantly, the no-action letter must be premised on one 
of Rule 14a-8(i)’s enumerated exceptions.57 The Commission first 
introduced the enumerated exceptions in 1948 to curb the submission of 
proposals that “are not necessarily in the common interest of the 
[company’s] security holders generally.”58 The exceptions are meant to 
achieve this goal without “unduly restricting” shareholders’ rights to 
submit shareholder proposals.59 Since the 1948 release, in which three 
exceptions were created,60 ten other exceptions have been introduced.61 
This Note focuses on the ordinary business operations exclusion.62 
  
 52 Id. at 1031. 
 53 Id. at 1032. Note that sometimes the staff will go further and explain its positions or 
note which arguments the staff found persuasive. It may also qualify its opinion. Id.. 
 54 Id. at 1033. For example, “the staff will not respond to requests involving issues or 
parties that are the subject of an ongoing enforcement investigation or proceeding.” Id. at 1034. 
 55 Id. at 1035. In an adverse response, the staff is more likely to provide the reasoning 
behind its position. Id. 
 56 Id. at 1024 n.22. 
The . . . Division of Market Regulation is primarily responsible for processing those no-
action requests under the 1934 Act dealing with the regulation of all aspects of the 
securities exchanges and related facilities, while the . . . Division of Corporation Finance 
is responsible for requests dealing with the proxy and other nonexchange aspects of the 
1934 Act. 
Id. 
 57 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2006). 
 58 Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 13 Fed. Reg. 6678, 6679 
(Nov. 13, 1948) [hereinafter 1948 Adopted Changes Release]. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-8(i). 
 62 See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7). 
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B. The “Ordinary Business Operations” Exclusion 
One of the most common exceptions used by corporations is 
Rule 14a-8(i)(7)’s “ordinary business operations” exclusion.63 Created in 
1954, there have been a number of important changes to the exclusion 
over time. First, the Commission has changed the exclusion’s language 
over the years in order to clarify the situations in which it should be 
used.64 In addition, the Commission introduced an exception to the 
exclusion for proposals that raise significant social policy issues.65 
Finally, the Commission developed a set of considerations that it uses to 
determine whether a proposal relates to the company’s ordinary business 
operations.66 
1. The Exclusion’s Language 
The Commission created the ordinary business operations 
exclusion in a 1954 release67 to alleviate corporations from having to 
include proposals when the subject matter of the proposal was “within 
the province of the management.”68 The ordinary business operations 
exclusion expressly clarifies that the board of directors controls matters 
relating to a company’s ordinary business operations about which 
shareholders should have no say, even through a shareholder proposal.69 
Since its introduction, the Commission has attempted to change the 
wording of the exclusion in order to clarify and provide guidance on the 
  
 63 See Proposals by Security Holders Notice of Proposed Amendments to Rule, 
Exchange Act Release No. 12,598, Investment Company Act Release No. 9345, 41 Fed. Reg. 
29,982, 29,984 (July 20, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 Proposed Changes Release]; Uhlenbrock, supra 
note 27, at 279. 
 64 See 1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,107; Adoption of 
Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 9539, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (Dec. 3, 1976) [hereinafter 
1976 Adopted Changes Release]; Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 34-4979, 19 
Fed. Reg. 246, 246 (Jan. 14, 1954) [hereinafter 1954 Adopted Changes Rule]. 
 65 See 1976 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 64, at 52,998; see infra Part II.B.2.  
 66 See 1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,108; 1976 Adopted Changes 
Release, supra note 64, at 52,998; see infra Part II.B.3. 
 67 1954 Adopted Changes Rule, supra note 64, at 246. 
 68 1953 Proposed Changes Release, supra note 33, at 6647. 
 69 See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-19,135, 47 Fed. Reg. 
47,420, 47,428-29 n.46 (Oct. 26, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Proposed Changes Release]. In creating the 
new exclusion, the release notes that the new exclusion is a corollary of another exclusion, the 
exclusion of proposals that are not proper subjects for action by shareholders under state law. See 
1954 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 64, at 246. 
Prior to 1954, many of the proposals included in proxy statements related to ordinary 
business operations, despite the presence of state laws which generally provided that the 
business and affairs of corporations shall be managed by their board of directors. In an 
effort to provide more guidance in this area, the Commission amended the security holder 
proposal rule to permit the exclusion of proposals relating to ordinary business. 
1982 Proposed Changes release, supra, at 47,428-29 n.46. 
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exclusion’s proper use. A brief overview of its evolution provides insight 
into what the Commission considers the proper use to be. 
The original language adopted in 1954 allowed a shareholder 
proposal to be omitted if it was “a recommendation or request that the 
management take action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct 
of the ordinary business operations of the issuer.”70 Since its introduction, 
the Commission has never drastically changed the language. Under the 
current regulations, a proposal may be excluded if it “deals with a matter 
relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.”71 
In 1976, the Commission suggested, but ultimately did not adopt, 
a change that would have allowed a proposal to be omitted only if it dealt 
with a “routine, day-to-day matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary 
business operations of the issuer.”72 This new language, the Commission 
asserted, would preserve a shareholder’s right to submit a proposal that 
dealt with an important issue even if it involved the ordinary business of 
the company.73 In 1998, the Commission suggested removing the term 
“ordinary business” altogether because it was a “legal term of art that 
provid[ed] little indication of the types of matters to which it refers.”74 
The proposed language allowed a shareholder proposal to be omitted “if 
the proposal relate[d] to specific business decisions normally left to the 
discretion of management” and included a non-exclusive list of examples 
of excludable proposals.75 Even though these changes were never 
  
 70 1954 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 64, at 247. 
 71 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2006). 
 72 1976 Proposed Changes Release, supra note 63, at 29,984 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). In order for companies to differentiate between important and routine issues, the 
Commission proposed adding language that allowed companies to omit proposals dealing 
“mundane” matters—matters that the board of directors ordinarily delegated to management—but 
not proposals dealing with matters that require board action. Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 22,828, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682, 50,685 (Sept. 26, 1997) 
[hereinafter 1997 Proposed Changes Release]. 
 75 1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,107. The non-exclusive list of 
examples would be included in a note following the revised text of the exclusion in the statute: 
Note to paragraph (i)(7): Examples of such matters include the way a newspaper formats 
its stock tables, whether a company charges an annual fee for use of its credit card, the 
wages a company pays its non-executive employees, and the way a company operates its 
dividend reinvestment plan. For an investment company, such matters include the 
decision whether to invest in the securities of a specific company. 
1997 Proposed Changes Release, supra note 74, at 50,704. The Commission suggested that the 
exclusion could even be clarified by merely adding additional guidance to the current language: 
An example of this approach would be to revise [the] current paragraph . . . to permit 
omission of a proposal “if it deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the company’s 
ordinary business operations (matters that should be left to the discretion of the 
company’s managers because of their complexity, impracticability of shareholder 
participation, or relative insignificance).” 
Id. at 50,685. 
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adopted, they provide insight into how the Commission views this 
exclusion. 
2. The “Significant Social Policy” Exception to the Exclusion 
In order to further clarify the proper use of the ordinary business 
exclusion, the Commission created the “significant social policy” 
exception to allow shareholder proposals that raise important issues76 to 
be included in management’s proxy materials even when those issues 
concern the company’s ordinary business.77 This section describes the 
creation and evolution of the significant social policy exception, explains 
its use, and explores the first attempt to use the significant social policy 
to advance an LGBT non-discrimination shareholder proposal. 
a. Basics of the Exception 
In December 1976, the Commission introduced the “significant 
social policy” exception to prevent the exclusion of shareholder 
proposals that raise issues of “considerable importance” to the 
shareholders78 by applying the ordinary business operations exclusion in 
a “somewhat more flexible manner” than before.79 Under this more 
flexible approach, proposals that have “significant policy, economic, or 
other implications inherent in them” or those with other “major 
implications” would not be excludable under the ordinary business 
operations exclusion even if they raised ordinary business issues.80 The 
Commission stated that the ordinary business operations exclusion 
should only be applied to exclude proposals dealing with “mundane” 
business matters and proposals without “any substantial policy or other 
considerations.”81 
Shareholder proposals that raise a significant social policy issue 
can be either corporate governance proposals or social policy proposals. 
Corporate governance proposals are those that relate to the governance of 
the corporation.82 For example, a proposal requesting that a corporation 
publish the names of shareholder-nominated candidates for director 
positions next to any candidates nominated by the corporation’s board of 
directors83 or a proposal seeking a bylaw amendment that would require a 
  
 76 The term “important issue” may seem nebulous, and it is. For a further discussion of 
which issues are considered important, see infra Part II.B.2.c.  
 77 See 1976 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 64, at 52,998 
 78 See 1976 Proposed Changes Release, supra note 63, at 29,984. 
 79 1976 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 64, at 52,997-98. 
 80 See id. at 52,998. 
 81 Id. at 52,998. 
 82 PASSOFF, supra note 18, at 1. 
 83 See Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 
121, 123 (2d Cir. 2006).  
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shareholder vote on the implementation of poison pills84 are both 
examples of corporate governance proposals. Social policy shareholder 
proposals are those whose subjects address social issues.85 Both types of 
proposals have the potential to fall under the significant social policy 
exception. 
In addition, shareholders submit proposals relating to 
employment decisions, particularly those dealing with employment 
discrimination.86 It is relatively easy to understand why proposals 
concerning simple employment decisions can and should be excluded 
under the ordinary business operations exclusion. For example, it is 
appropriate to allow a company to exclude proposals about employee 
salaries because they go to the heart of the ordinary business exclusion.87 
Management must constantly assess and adjust salary levels to attract 
and retain employees.88 In addition, management is in a better position 
than shareholders to make the decisions because shareholders, as a class, 
do not have knowledge of all of the circumstances and facts informing 
the decision and it would be impractical to seek a shareholder vote to set 
each employee’s compensation.89 
b. Cracker Barrel: The First LGBT Rights Shareholder Proposal 
The first time that a shareholder used a proposal to urge LGBT 
non-discrimination protection occurred in 1992 against Cracker Barrel,90 
a restaurant chain based in Tennessee.91 In a 1991 company memo, 
Cracker Barrel vice president for human resources William A. Bridges 
  
 84 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 975 P.2d 907, 909 (Okla. 
1999). Poison pills are mechanisms by which corporate boards attempt to protect their company 
from a hostile take-over. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2186 (2008). Most poison pills are 
provisions that state that shareholders have the right to purchase new shares of common stock, 
triggered when a shareholder buys or attempts to buy a certain amount of the corporation’s stock. Id. 
Since the triggering shareholder is not given the same right to purchase, that shareholder’s stake is 
diluted. Id. 
 85 PASSOFF, supra note 18, at 1; see, e.g., Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 
F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (shareholder proposal 
requesting that Dow stop selling napalm); Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, 821 F. Supp. 877, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 86 See e.g., Amalgamated Clothing, 821 F. Supp. at 879 (shareholder proposal requesting 
that Wal-Mart distribute reports about equal employment and affirmative action). 
 87 See e.g., Union Bankshares Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 851097, at *3 (Mar. 
24, 2006) (proposal excludable under the ordinary business exclusion where it seeks to reduce the 
increase in employee salaries and benefits over the next five years); Hydron Technologies, Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 232587, at *2-*3 (May 8, 1997) (part of the proposal excludable under 
the ordinary business exclusion where it seeks to cap annual employee salaries for all employees at 
$100,000). 
 88 See, e.g., Union Bankshares Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 851097, at *3 
(Mar. 24, 2006). 
 89 See, e.g., id.  
 90 See PASSOFF, supra note 18, at 6. 
 91 Gustav Niebuhr, Cracker Barrel Chain Angers Gay Groups with Written Policy—Firm 
Briefly Adopted Rule Permitting the Dismissal of Homosexual Workers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1991, 
at C11. 
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announced that homosexuality was against the values upon which 
Cracker Barrel was founded and to which its customers adhered.92 
According to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Cracker Barrel 
subsequently fired twelve gay and lesbian employees.93 After a public 
backlash,94 Mr. Bridges released another memo rescinding the policy,95 
although the fired employees were not rehired.96 In response, the New 
York City Employees’ Retirement System (“NYCERS”),97 a Cracker 
Barrel shareholder, requested that Cracker Barrel clarify its position on 
the hiring of gay and lesbian employees.98 NYCERS was concerned 
“about the potential negative impact on the company’s sales and 
earnings, which could result from adverse public reaction, such as 
organized boycotts and picketing of restaurants.”99 After receiving no 
response from Cracker Barrel, NYCERS submitted a shareholder 
proposal requesting that Cracker Barrel add “sexual orientation” as a 
protected class to its non-discrimination policy.100  
Cracker Barrel sought to exclude the proposal from its proxy 
statement under the ordinary business operations exclusion by requesting 
a no-action letter.101 In its no-action letter response, the Commission not 
only agreed that the proposal could be excluded, but also outlined a new 
far-reaching standard under which future no-action letter requests 
regarding employment matters would be decided.102 The so-called 
“Cracker Barrel Standard”103 stated that employment-based proposals104 
would be treated as ordinary business decisions even if they raised 
significant social policy issues and would therefore always be excludable 
by corporations.105 
  
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 The public backlash included protests, sit-ins, and boycotts at Cracker Barrel 
restaurants in several states. See Peter T. Kilborn, Gay Rights Groups Take Aim at Restaurant Chain 
That’s Hot on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1992, at A12. 
 95 See Niebuhr, supra note 91. 
 96 William Bunch, City Pension Fund Puts Gay Filings on Chain’s Menu, NEWSDAY, 
Mar. 20, 1991, at 21. 
 97 NYCERS is an “institutional investor[] that routinely submit[s] employment-related 
proposals to companies in which [it] owns stock.” New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 843 
F. Supp. 858, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (NYCERS I), rev’d, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 98 Company Is Asked About Bias in Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at B4. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Cracker Barrel’s Policy on Gays Faces Action by New York Fund, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1991. 
 101 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j) (2006); see also note 49 and accompanying text. For a 
discussion of the steps a corporation must follow in order to exclude a shareholder proposal for one 
of the substantive reasons provided in Rule 14a-8(i), see supra notes 57-62. 
 102 Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 289095, at 
*1-*2 (Oct. 13, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Cracker Barrel Letter]. 
 103 See Uhlenbrock, supra note 27, at 280. 
 104 The bright-line rule did not exclude proposals that related to executive compensation. 
Id. at *1. 
 105 Id. The letter specifically stated that: 
 
2009] LGBT NON-DISCRIMINATION THROUGH SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 1525 
NYCERS challenged the no-action letter, first by unsuccessfully 
seeking reversal from the Commission,106 and then by suing the 
Commission in the Southern District of New York.107 NYCERS’ suit 
argued that the Cracker Barrel Standard was unenforceable because the 
Commission did not subject it to the “notice and comment” period 
required by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and because the 
Commission’s interpretation was “arbitrary and capricious.”108 
Under the APA, agencies such as the Commission must subject 
new or amended rules to a public “notice and comment” period unless, 
among other things, the rule is merely interpretive.109 In addition, courts 
can reverse “arbitrary [and] capricious” rules110 unless “the plaintiffs 
have an adequate alternative legal remedy against someone else—a 
remedy that offers the same relief the plaintiffs seek from the agency.”111 
NYCERS prevailed when the district court held the Cracker 
Barrel Standard invalid because it required a “notice and comment” 
period under the APA.112 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit 
reversed the lower court, holding that the Cracker Barrel Standard did 
not have to determine whether the standard was “arbitrary and 
capricious” because it concluded that plaintiffs had “an effective 
alternative” of suiting Cracker Barrel, and could raise its arbitrary and 
capricious argument in that suit.113 With its decision, the Second Circuit 
solidified the Cracker Barrel Standard’s applicability to all shareholder 
proposals dealing with employment matters—at least for a while. 
  
[T]he fact that a shareholder proposal concerning a company’s employment policies and 
practices for the general workforce is tied to a social issue will no longer be viewed as 
removing the proposal from the realm of ordinary business operations of the registrant. 
Rather, determinations with respect to any such proposals are properly governed by the 
employment-based nature of the proposal. 
Id. 
 106 Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 11016, at *1 
(Jan. 15, 1993). 
 107 New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (NYCERS I), 843 F. 
Supp. 858, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 108 Id.  
 109 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006); NYCERS I, 843 F. Supp. at 872. The two other instances 
in which a rule is not required to undergo notice and comment are if the rule is “a statement of 
policy, or a rule regarding agency organization, procedure, or practice.” NYCERS I, 843 F. Supp. at 
872; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
 110 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  
 111 New York City Employee’s Ret. Sys. v. SEC (NYCERS II), 45 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 112 NYCERS I, 843 F. Supp. at 881. “The APA requires agencies to provide an 
opportunity for notice and comment prior to adoption or amendment of a rule, unless the rule is 
interpretive, a statement of policy, or a rule regarding agency organization, procedure or practice.” 
Id. at 872 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)). 
 113 NYCERS II, 45 F.3d at 14. 
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3. The Ordinary Business Operations Test 
In 1998, only six years after first announcing the Cracker Barrel 
Standard, the Commission killed it, returning instead to analyzing each 
no-action letter on a case-by-case basis.114 According to the Commission, 
“the relative importance of certain social issues relating to employment 
matters has reemerged as a consistent topic of widespread public 
debate.”115 The Commission also noted that many shareholders were 
interested in expressing their opinions to the corporations in which they 
invest regarding employment issues that raise social policy issues.116 
Since 1998, the Commission no longer automatically restricts 
shareholders from submitting important employment-related proposals 
designed to protect minority employees.117 The Commission’s change in 
policy paved the way for the use of shareholder proposals’ as a non-
traditional way to champion LGBT rights. 
Even though proposals about LGBT non-discrimination are no 
longer automatically excludable, they are far from automatically 
includable. In order to determine whether a particular proposal will be 
excludable, the Commission released the two “principal considerations” 
under which the staff determines whether a proposal may be properly 
omitted from a company’s proxy statement.118 Both considerations 
involve subjective analysis.119 
The first consideration involves the proposal’s subject matter, 
recognizing that “[c]ertain tasks are so fundamental to management’s 
ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis that they could not, as a 
practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder oversight.”120 “Examples 
include the management of the workforce, such as the hiring, promotion, 
and termination of employees, decisions on production quality and 
quantity, and the retention of suppliers.”121 
Importantly, the first consideration is also subject to the 
aforementioned exception for proposals that raise “significant social 
policy issues.”122 Therefore, even if a proposal concerned a subject matter 
fundamental management decision-making, it would not be excludable if 
it raised a significant social policy issue because it “transcend[s] the day-
  
 114 See 1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,107-08. 
 115 Id. at 29,108. 
 116 See id.  
 117 See id. “Nearly all commenters from the shareholder community who addressed the 
matter supported the reversal of this position. Most commenters from the corporate community did 
not favor the proposal to reverse Cracker Barrel . . . .” Id. (citations omitted). 
 118 Id. at 29,108. 
 119 Uhlenbrock, supra note 27, at 298. 
 120 1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,108. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
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to-day business matters and raise[s] policy issues so significant that it 
would be appropriate for a shareholder vote.”123 
The second consideration focuses on “the degree to which the 
proposal seeks to ‘micro-manage’ the company by probing too deeply 
into matters of a complex nature upon which shareholders, as a group, 
would not be in a position to make an informed judgment.”124 The 
Commission suggested that a proposal would be properly omitted from 
proxy materials if it “involves intricate detail, or seeks to impose specific 
time-frames or methods for implementing complex policies” but that the 
Commission’s determinations will be made on a “case-by-case basis” 
considering “factors such as the nature of the proposal and the 
circumstances of the company to which it is directed.”125 
Apache was decided under this two-part test.126 Recall that the 
shareholder proposal submitted by The Funds listed ten principles to 
which it wanted Apache to adhere in its employment practices.127 Judge 
Gray Miller recognized that the proposal as a whole sought to affect 
employment discrimination but found that three of its principles did not 
implicate employment discrimination.128 Therefore, relying on the rule 
that “the [p]roposal must be read with all of its parts,” Judge Miller 
concluded that the proposal as a whole did not implicate a social policy 
issue.129 
Even though he already determined the case’s outcome—if the 
proposal does not raise a significant social policy issue, it is excludable 
under the ordinary business operations exclusion—the Judge addressed 
the second consideration.130 He found that the proposal sought to 
“micromanage the company to an unacceptable degree” because 
shareholders would not be able to grasp the intricate workings of the 
company.131  
  
 123 Id. The Commission’s example of a matter that raises a “sufficiently significant social 
policy issue[]” is “significant discrimination matters.” Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 29,108-09. For example, timing might raise a significant social policy issue 
where there is a great difference at issue or timing is of great importance. See id. at 29,109. The 
Commission also clarified that not “all proposals seeking detail, or seeking to promote time-frames 
or methods, necessarily amount[ed] to ‘ordinary business.’” Id. 
 126 Apache Corp. v. New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys., No. H-08-1064, 2008 WL 
1821728, *4-*5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2008). 
 127 Id. at *1-*2; see supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. 
 128 See Apache, 2008 WL 1821728, at *6. Interestingly, Judge Miller seemed to recognize 
that the proposal—seeking LGBT non-discrimination in employment only—raised a significant 
social policy issue when he said that “[the last four] principles do not implicate the social policy 
underlying the Proposal.” See id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See id.  
 131 Id.  
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III. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS SEEKING LGBT NON-
DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS ARE SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL 
POLICY ISSUES 
As discussed above, when a company seeks to omit a 
shareholder proposal under the ordinary business exclusion, the 
Commission’s staff will use the two-part test outlined in the 1998 
Release to determine whether the exclusion will apply.132 In contrast to 
the Commission’s and Judge Miller’s rulings in Apache, shareholder 
proposals seeking non-discrimination protections based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity and expression should not fall under Rule 
14a-8(i)(7)’s ordinary business exclusion because they raise significant 
social policy issues upon which shareholders are able to make an 
informed judgment.  
A. LGBT Discrimination Is a Significant Social Policy Issue 
This section argues that workplace discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity and expression is a significant 
social policy issue that transcends day-to-day business matters and an 
issue to which the ordinary business exclusion should not apply.133 First, 
this section discusses that the Commission recognizes that whether a 
particular issue raises a significant social policy changes with the 
changing social climate.134 As a result, the Commission will reconsider 
its earlier determinations and rule that issues it once found were not 
indicative of significant social policy now rise to that category.135 
Consequently, the Commission’s decisions on proposals for LGBT non-
discrimination policies can similarly be reexamined.136 It argues, second, 
that in light of the current social climate, LGBT non-discrimination 
protections should be regarded as a significant social policy issue.137 
Finally, this section argues that LGBT workplace discrimination can take 
many different forms, and therefore shareholder proposals seeking non-
discrimination in areas that affect workplace treatment should also be 
excepted from the ordinary business exclusion.138 
  
 132 See infra Part II.B.3. 
 133 See supra note 123. 
 134 See Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice with Respect 
to Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 12,599, Investment Company Act Release No. 
9344, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,989, 29,991 (July 7, 1976) [hereinafter July 1976 Release]. For a more 
detailed discussion, see infra Part III.A.1. 
 135 1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,108. For a more detailed 
discussion, see infra Part III.A.1.  
 136  See infra note 141. 
 137 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 138 See infra Part III.A.2. 
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1. Significant Social Policies Emerge from Changing Social 
Attitudes 
What is considered a significant social policy issue changes with 
time. The Commission stated that its “views on certain issues may 
change from time-to-time, in light of re-examination, new 
considerations, or changing conditions which indicate that its earlier 
views are no longer in keeping with the objectives of Rule 14a-8.”139 
Specifically, the Commission’s staff changes its positions to “reflect[] 
changing societal views . . . with respect to ‘social policy’ proposals 
involving ordinary business.”140 This means that the fact that LGBT non-
discrimination is not currently a significant social policy issue in the eyes 
of the Commission does not foreclose the possibility that the 
Commission will later make such a determination.  
Historically, several shareholder proposal issues that were 
formerly excludable as ordinary business matters are now seen by the 
Commission as non-excludable significant social policy issues.141 The 
common thread through each example is that the issue raises a 
widespread public debate. 
For example, the Commission reconsidered and now holds as 
non-excludable the issue whether to close or relocate a company 
facility.142 Such reconsideration was prompted when a shareholder 
submitted a proposal requesting that the Pacific Telesis Group study the 
effects of closing company facilities on the communities in which those 
facilities were located and to develop alternatives to alleviate the harm to 
those communities.143 Pacific Telesis sought to exclude the proposal 
under the ordinary business operations exclusion because the 
Commission had consistently recognized that proposals dealing with 
closing company facilities were ordinary business matters.144 
  
 139 July 1976 Release, supra note 134, at 86, 605. 
 140 1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,108. 
 141 See, e.g., Reebok Int’l Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 55815, at *1 (Mar. 16, 
1992) [hereinafter Reebok Letter]; Transamerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 285806, at 
*1 (Jan. 10, 1990) [hereinafter Transamerica Letter]; Pac. Telesis Group, SEC No-Action Letter, 
1989 WL 245523, at *1 (Feb. 2, 1989) [hereinafter Pacific Telesis Letter]. 
 142 See Pacific Telesis Letter, supra note 141, at *1. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. (citing Gen. Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 43005 (Jan. 29, 1988)). 
The company also argued that even though the proposal sought a study, it still related to ordinary 
business operations. Id. (citing Exchange Act Release No. 20,091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218, 38,221, 
(1983)). 
[The SEC staff’s former position was] that proposals requesting issuers to prepare reports 
on specific aspects of their business or to form special committees to study a segment of 
their business would not be excludable under [the ordinary business exclusion]. Because 
this interpretation raises form over substance and renders the provisions of [the ordinary 
business exclusion] largely a nullity, the Commission has determined to adopt the 
interpretative change set forth in the Proposing Release. Henceforth, the staff will 
consider whether the subject matter of the special report or the committee involves a 
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In its response, the Commission reconsidered its past treatment 
of this issue and concluded that proposals about closing company 
facilities could not be excluded if the proposals dealt “with the broad 
social and economic impact” of the closings.145 The Commission held 
that these proposals now raise significant social policy issues because of 
the “heightened state and federal interest in the social and economic 
implications” of closing corporate facilities.146 
Another example of a reconsidered issue, which the Commission 
reexamined in two decisions, is executive compensation.147 First, the 
Commission recognized “golden parachute” payments148 as a significant 
social policy issue149 when a shareholder submitted a proposal to 
Transamerica Corp. requesting that the corporation disallow such 
payments.150 While the Commission had previously held that golden 
parachutes were ordinary business matters,151 it found these payments 
rose to matters of significant social policy because Internal Revenue 
Code interpretations had recently clarified the difference between golden 
parachute payments and ordinary compensation and because there was a 
current “public debate” about the implications of golden parachute 
contracts.152 After recognizing that golden parachute payments were a 
significant social policy issue, the Commission eventually concluded that 
all executive compensation was a significant social policy issue153 
because of the “widespread public debate” about the issue.154 
  
matter of ordinary business; where it does, the proposal will be excludable under [the 
ordinary business exclusion]. 
Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by 
Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 20,091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218, 38,220-21 (Aug. 23, 
1983) [hereinafter 1983 Adopted Changes Release]. Note that Rule 14a-8(c)(7) is the precursor to 
Rule 14a-8(i)(7). See 1998 Adopted Changes, supra note 32, at 29,120. 
 145 Pacific Telesis Letter, supra note 141. The Commission’s staff noted that proposals 
dealing with the closing of specific corporate facilities would still be omitted as relating to ordinary 
business operations. See id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See Reebok Letter, supra note 141, at *1; Transamerica Letter, supra note 141, at *1. 
 148 Golden parachutes are payments that a corporate executive would receive if he or she 
were to lose his or her job and usually apply when there is a change in company ownership (as 
would be the case in a take-over). 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2181 (2008). 
 149 See Transamerica Letter, supra note 141, at *1.  
 150 See id. 
 151 See id. The company also argued that the proposal could be excluded because it would 
violate state law (then Rule 14a-8(c)(2); now Rule 14a-8(i)(2)) and because it is contrary to the 
Commission’s Proxy Rules and Regulations (then Rule 14a-8(c)(3); now Rule 14a-8(i)(3)). Id. at *4-*5.  
 152 Id. at *1. The Commission’s staff noted that proposals about ordinary executive 
compensation would still be excludable as relating to ordinary business operations. Id. 
 153 Reebok Letter, supra note 141, at *1. 
 154 Id. at *1. In 1992, a Reebok shareholder submitted a proposal requesting that Reebok 
establish a “Compensation Committee” composed entirely of independent directors to “evaluate and 
establish executive compensation.” Id. Reebok sought to omit the proposal on the grounds that 
executive compensation was an ordinary business matter. See id. at *3-*4. The Commission 
reconsidered its position regarding executive and director compensation and determined that it was a 
significant social policy issue. Id. at *1. 
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2. “Changing Societal Views” and “Widespread Public Debate” 
Issues relating to LGBT non-discrimination are currently some 
of the most-discussed social issues. Across the country, issues relating to 
sexual orientation and gender identity and expression have been part of 
the public debate for the last several years. The public debate centers on 
rights afforded (or taken away) from the LGBT community, including 
marriage rights (including the debate about the differences between civil 
unions, domestic partnerships, and marriage), rights incident to marriage 
(including hospital visitation, survivorship rights, etc.), legal non-
discrimination protection (Civil Rights Act Protections), adoption rights, 
and hate-crime legislation. Not only are all of these issues matters of 
greater social policy debate, they are all matters of corporate policy, and 
thus are proper issues for shareholders to raise in proposals. 
Changing societal values can be seen in the increased acceptance 
of LGBT individuals and non-discrimination protections155 and in the 
increased visibility of the LGBT community in mainstream media and 
entertainment.156 Newsweek’s public opinion polls show that support for 
every area of LGBT equity has increased through the years.157 In 
addition, public polls also show a changing societal view of the LGBT 
community because support for every area of LGBT equality has 
increased through the years.158 In 2008, 39% of Americans supported full 
same-sex marriage equality, up 6% from 2004.159 But in 2008, 55% 
supported some type of alternative legal union, up 15% from 2004.160 
Support for same-sex couples’ rights to adopt children also increased 8% 
to 53%.161 Finally, a whopping 73% of Americans support extending 
health insurance and other employee benefits to gays and lesbians, up 
13% from 2004.162 
Increased acceptance of the LGBT community into mainstream 
media and entertainment also evidences the change in societal values.163 
Many of today’s most popular television shows and movies feature 
LGBT characters that have developed characters that are not dissimilar in 
complexity from the show’s heterosexual characters. Entertainment has 
  
 155 See Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkampf, or, How America Overruled 
Bowers v. Hardwick, even though Romer v. Evans Didn’t, 49 DUKE L.J. 1559, 1600 (2000) (arguing 
“[c]hanges in social attitudes have already yielded important gains in gay civil rights generally”). 
 156 See id.  
 157 Arian Campo-Flores, A Gay Marriage Surge, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, Dec. 5, 
2008, available at http://wwwnewsweek.com/id/172399 (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
 158 See id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id.  
 161 Id.  
 162 Id.  
 163 See Michaelson, supra note 155 at 1600 (arguing that portrayal of LGBT characters in 
the media “suggest[s] a sea change in the way gay families function and are depicted in American 
cultural life”). 
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come a long way from the first gay on-screen kiss to having transgender 
characters.164 
Even though “[c]hanges in societal attitudes have already yielded 
important gains in [LGBT] civil rights generally,” there is still a very 
widespread public debate about the validity of LGBT non-discrimination 
protections.165 Justice Antonin Scalia recognized this widespread public 
debate when he penned is dissent in Romer v. Evans,166 referring to the 
debate as a “Kulturkampf” or culture war.167 And as Professor Jay 
Michaelson put it, “it takes two to kulturkampf.”168 The continued fight 
over non-discrimination protections show that the widespread public 
debate is ongoing.169 
No contemporary issue more clearly evidences the widespread 
public debate about LGBT rights than the issue of same-sex marriage 
equality. Same sex couples can get married in only four states to date, 
Massachusetts,170 Connecticut,171 Iowa,172 and Vermont.173 A few other 
states offer another form of recognition for same-sex couples such as 
civil unions or domestic partnerships,174 but many gay-marriage 
advocates claim that these unions are merely separate and unequal 
alternatives to marriage.175 Furthermore, same-sex couples are denied the 
1,049 federal benefits that heterosexual married couples enjoy because 
federal law does not recognize same-sex marriages or unions.176 In 
  
 164 The first same-sex kiss on primetime television was between Kerr Smith and Adam 
Kauffman on “Dawson’s Creek” in 2000. Don Chareunsy, EXTRA: The TV History of Gay Liplocks, 
EXTRA, May 24, 2000, available at http://www.hollywood.com/news/EXTRA_The_TV_ 
History_of_Gay_Liplocks/312388. The first transgender character was on the soap-opera “All My 
Children” in 2006. Dan J. Kroll, AMC introduces daytime’s first transgender character, 
Soapcentral.com, Nov. 29, 2006, available at http://www.soapcentral.com/amc/news/2006/1127- 
transgender.php?printonly=yes. 
 165 Michaelson, supra note 155 at 1600-03; id. at 1602 (“Gay men and lesbians are still 
the object of intense social hostility . . . .”). 
 166 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 167 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 168 Michaelson, supra note 155 at 1601. 
 169 See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Intuition, Morals, and the Legal Conversation 
About Gay Rights, 32 NOVA L. REV. 523 (2008). 
 170 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that 
Massachusetts could not deny marriage to same-sex couples).  
 171 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (holding that 
marriage could not be withheld from same-sex couples).  
 172 Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, slip op. at 1 (Iowa Apr. 3, 2009) (holding an Iowa 
statute limiting marriage to one man and woman unconstitutional).  
 173 Abby Goodnough & Anahad O’Connor, Vermont Legislature Legalizes Same-Sex 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009. 
 174 Human Rights Campaign, Relationship Recognition in the U.S., 
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2009). 
 175 See generally Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont’s Civil 
Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate but (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113 (2000) (arguing 
that civil unions will never be equal to marriage unless and until they are recognized by all other 
states and the federal government).  
 176 Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, 
Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Jan. 31, 1997), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf. 
2009] LGBT NON-DISCRIMINATION THROUGH SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 1533 
addition, same-sex unions performed in states that provide for them do 
not have to be recognized by other states,177 and currently New York 
State is the only state that does not recognize same-sex marriage that will 
recognize a same-sex marriage performed out-of-state.178 
Marriage equality has taken a main stage in elections in the last 
fifteen years.179 Public referendums amending state constitutions to 
define marriage as between one man and one woman have swept the 
country; to date, forty-two states’ constitutions or laws define marriage 
in such way.180 Each of these elections involved frequent public debate 
concerning the rights of LGBT citizens, and the 2008 fight over 
California’s Proposition 8, a ballot measure that amended California’s 
constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage, is a perfect example. The 
campaign for Proposition 8 was heated, with spending on each side 
totaling more than $75 million, making it “one of the most expensive 
ballot measures ever waged.”181 Even after the measure passed, the social 
debate continued. New activists emerged to mobilize supporters to repeal 
the ban182 and supporters of LGBT rights turned out in massive numbers 
to protest its passage in cities across the country.183 In California, 
business owners complained about losing a substantial amount of same-
sex marriage business in the midst of a recession,184 while same-sex 
marriage related business in Massachusetts was projected in 2008 to 
result in 330 additional jobs and a $111 million economic boost for the 
state over the next three years.185 Finally, Reverend Rick Warren, the 
  
 177 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
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pastor chosen to deliver the invocation at President Obama’s 
inauguration, was harshly criticized for his support of Proposition 8.186 
The debate over gay adoption also evidences the public debate 
surrounding LBGT rights. For example, in 2008, Arkansas voters 
approved a ballot measure to limit adoptions to only married couples 
who live together.187 This measure was created with the intent of 
prohibiting gay and lesbian adoption.188 On the other side of the debate, a 
Florida Circuit Court held that Florida’s explicit ban on gay and lesbian 
adoption was unconstitutional.189   
The debate over employment discrimination also is indicative of 
the public debate about LGBT rights. There is currently no federal law 
banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender 
identity. Only twelve states provide such protection.190 That means that in 
a whopping eighteen states anyone can lose their job simply because they 
are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered.191 Corporate America, 
however, has taken the lead in addressing the issue of LGBT non-
discrimination. Of the Fortune 500 companies, 88% provide protection 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation and 25% provide it 
based on gender identity.192  
3. All LGBT Non-Discrimination Proposals Raise Significant 
Social Policy Issues 
Since the Commission analyzes no-action letter requests from 
companies seeking to exclude proposals from their proxy statements on a 
case-by-case basis, past no-action letters are not binding on future 
Commission determinations.193 But since they are interpretations of the 
Commission’s staff, they are still an important indication of what the 
staff is thinking.194 In addition, proposals such as the one in Apache195 
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sometimes request that non-discrimination extend to all areas of the 
business, including charitable contributions, advertising, marketing, and 
sale or purchase of goods and services.196 Since all of these specific non-
discrimination proposals raise significant social policy issues, all 
proposals that request LGBT non-discrimination protections are 
significant social policy issues and corporations should be required to 
include them in the corporate proxy materials. 
Proposals that deal with charitable contributions, a classic matter 
of ordinary business operations, have been recognized by the 
Commission’s staff as raising significant social policy issues.197 In 2008, 
a Ford shareholder submitted a proposal requesting that Ford “list the 
recipients of charitable contributions of $5000 or more on [its] 
website.”198 Ford sought to exclude the proposal under the ordinary 
business exclusion because the proposal was about “marketing and 
public relations as they relate to charitable donations.”199 The 
Commission, however, did not agree with Ford’s argument200 and the 
proposal was subsequently included in Ford’s proxy materials. 
The Commission has also recognized that a proposal requesting 
that a corporation purchase from minority and female-owned suppliers 
could not be excluded under the ordinary business operations exclusion 
because “questions with respect to equal employment opportunity . . . 
involve policy decisions beyond those personnel matters that constitute 
the Company’s ordinary business.”201 
Finally, there is also widespread public debate about sexual 
orientation and advertising. Individuals and organizations on both sides 
of the issue closely follow which companies advertise to the LGBT 
community.202 These activists alert their supporters, often resulting in a 
national debate about certain companies’ advertising policies.203 The 
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national debate is usually expressed when activists instigate company 
boycotts.204 
B. LGBT Non-Discrimination Proposals Do Not Seek to 
Micromanage Corporations 
In addition to raising significant social policy issues, LGBT non-
discrimination proposals do not exhibit any characteristics of 
micromanagement. The second consideration the Commission uses to 
determine if the ordinary business operations exclusion will apply to a 
particular proposal is the degree to which a proposal “seeks to 
micromanage the company.”205 The Commission explicitly stated that 
proposals will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, but “some proposals 
may intrude unduly on a company’s ‘ordinary business’ operations by 
virtue of the level of detail that they seek.”206 
When introducing the test, the Commission cited four examples 
of shareholder proposals that sought to micromanage a corporation.207 
Each of these four proposals differs radically from a proposal that merely 
seeks protection of LGBT rights, such as those that The Funds proposed 
that Apache adopt in 2008. Since LGBT non-discrimination proposals do 
not micromanage in the way that the Commission intended, companies 
should be required to include these proposals in their proxy materials. 
The first proposal that the Commission cited as an example of 
micromanagement was submitted to Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (“Capital 
Cities”).208 There, the shareholders requested that the corporation create a 
report for shareholders detailing several of the corporation’s affirmative 
action policies.209 Among other things, the proposal requested “[a] 
summary of Affirmative Action Programs and timetables to improve 
performance . . . and a description of major problems in meeting the 
network’s goals.”210 The Commission agreed with Capital Cities that the 
proposal could be omitted from Capital Cities’ proxy materials under the 
ordinary business operations exclusion.211 
The Commission’s second example was a proposal submitted to 
Templeton Dragon Fund, Inc. (“Templeton”).212 The proposal requested 
that Templeton’s board create a corporate policy that required them to 
“make annual offers to repurchase at least 5%, and up to 25% of its 
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outstanding shares at net asset value commencing with an initial 
repurchase of 25% of its outstanding shares.”213 The Commission agreed 
with Templeton that it could exclude the proposal under the ordinary 
business operations because the proposal was too intricate.214 
Third, the Commission cited a proposal requesting that 
Burlington Northern Railroad report “what corporate funds have been 
expended to date on [the development of a new technology] . . . 
specifically what has been accomplished in the way of hardware and 
software development, systems testing, added personnel requirements for 
future maintenance,” the status of the technological development, the 
corporation’s “intent[ions] to continue the project,” the cost at which it 
intends to continue the project, and when the corporation expects the 
project to be completed.215 Again, the Commission agreed with 
Burlington Northern that the proposal could be excluded under the 
ordinary business operations exclusion.216 
Finally, the Commission’s last example of micromanagement 
was a proposal to Du Pont requesting that the corporation “[r]apidly 
accelerate plans to phase out [chlorofluorocarbon (“CFC”)] and halon 
production . . . [and] . . . report to shareholders within six months . . . 
research and development program expenditures which dramatically 
increase efforts to find CFC and halon substitutes.”217 The Commission 
agreed with Du Pont that the proposal could be excluded from Du Pont’s 
proxy materials because the proposal related to the corporation’s 
ordinary business operations.218 In addition, the D.C. Circuit Court 
clarified, in an opinion written by soon-to-be Supreme Court Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, that the problem with the proposal was that it 
“relates not to whether CFC production should be phased out, but when 
the phase out should be completed.”219  
In contrast to the examples of shareholder micromanagement, 
proposals such as The Fund’s proposal to Apache merely ask that the 
corporation include a classification of people to its already existing non-
discrimination policy. The proposals above either provide detailed 
instructions to corporate management or set specific timelines in which 
management must complete the request. Unlike the Capital Cities 
proposal, non-discrimination proposals do not ask for the corporation to 
provide a report to shareholders, especially one that requires summaries, 
tables, and descriptions. Unlike the Templeton proposal, non-
discrimination proposals do not specify percentages, limits, or 
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thresholds, instead they merely request that the corporation not 
discriminate. Unlike the Burlington Northern proposal, non-
discrimination proposals do not ask for information regarding the use of 
corporate funds, specific statuses of projects, management intentions, or 
management expectations. Finally, unlike the Du Pont proposal, non-
discrimination proposals do not ask for the corporation to complete the 
proposal within a certain time period or provide corporate expenditure 
reports. 
Unlike the Commission’s examples of micromanagement, non-
discrimination proposals are not complicated. They do not seek to 
impose time limitations, nor are they intricate. These proposals are 
simple and straightforward. Therefore, shareholders should be able and 
entitled to review and vote on these proposals. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Shareholders can use the shareholder proposal process provided 
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to suggest that the corporations in 
which they invest add LGBT non-discrimination policies. In response, 
the corporations can attempt to exclude the proposal from their proxy 
materials under the ordinary business operations exclusion. Shareholder 
proposals that seek LGBT non-discrimination protections should never 
be excludable because they raise significant social policy issues and do 
not seek to micromanage the corporation. 
American society’s acceptance of the LGBT community has 
been increasing and it is clear that societal views towards LGBT rights 
have been changing, too. These changing societal views have also 
contributed to the public debate about LGBT rights. Moreover, recent 
political and legal events also evidence the public debate. Finally, 
proposals seeking LGBT rights do not seek to micromanage 
corporations; they are straightforward and simple. 
If the Commission expanded the significant social policy 
exception to LGBT non-discrimination policies, concerned shareholders 
would be better able to influence corporations to recognize the value of 
all employees. But even without the significant social policy’s help, 
activist shareholders are still successful. As mentioned above, many 
corporations faced with these proposals acquiesce and add non-
discrimination protection.  
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